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This paper explores the role of coinductive methods in modeling ﬁnite interactive
computing agents. The computational extension of computing agents from algo-
rithms to interaction parallels the mathematical extension of set theory and algebra
from inductive to coinductive models. Maximal ﬁxed points are shown to play a
role in models of observation that parallels minimal ﬁxed points in inductive math-
ematics. The impact of interactive (coinductive) models on Church’s thesis and
the connection between incompleteness and greater expressiveness are examined. A
ﬁnal section shows that actual software systems are interactive rather than algo-
rithmic. Coinductive models could become as important as inductive models for
software technology as computer applications become increasingly interactive.
1 Extensions of Expressiveness
The robust equivalence of Turing machines, the lambda calculus, and recur-
sively enumerable sets has led to widespread acceptance of the thesis that
Turing machines express the intuitive notion of computation. Because re-
searchers assumed that questions of expressiveness of ﬁnite computing agents
had been settled once and for all, they did not explore alternative models of
computability, focusing instead on questions of complexity, performance, and
design of algorithms. The hypothesis that interactive ﬁnite computing agents
are more expressive than algorithms opens up a research area that had been
considered closed, and requires reexamination of fundamental assumptions
about models of computation.
We have shown [We1,WG] that interaction machines that provide services
over time are more expressive than Turing machines that compute functions.
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The extension of expressiveness from algorithms to interaction is formal-
ized by recent extensions of set theory and algebra [Ac,BM,JR]. Non-well-
founded set theory models sequential interaction by formalizing the semantics
of streams [BM]:
extension of computational expressiveness: algorithms → interaction
extension of set theoretic expressiveness: well-founded sets → non-
well-founded sets
extension of algebraic expressiveness: algebras → coalgebras
Models of interaction, just like algorithmic models, can be described in
complementary ways by sets and algebras. Non-well-founded sets are the
interactive analog of recursively enumerable sets for Turing machines, while
coalgebras play the role of the lambda calculus. Coinduction underlies non-
well-founded set theory, coalgebra, and interaction as an abstract principle
of deﬁnition, reasoning, and modeling. Coinduction is related to abduction,
which infers inner system properties from their observed behavior [We3].
extension of mathematical expressiveness: inductive models → coin-
ductive (abductive) models
The equivalent expressiveness of TMs, algorithms, computable functions,
and formal systems is due largely to their common use of induction as a basis
for system speciﬁcation.
The Church-Turing thesis has the form “the formally deﬁnable notion X
corresponds to an intuitive notion Y ”. It equates the intuitive notion of algo-
rithmic computation with the formal notion of Turing computable functions
from integers to integers:
Church-Turing Thesis: The intuitive notion of algorithms is formally
expressed by Turing machines.
X = algorithms, Y = Turing machines
In section 5 we extend the Church-Turing thesis from algorithms to se-
quential and multi-agent interaction by extending both the intuitive notion X
of computation and the associated formal notion Y :
E1: The intuitive notion of sequential interaction is formally expressed by
non-well-founded sets.
X = sequential (single-stream) interaction, Y = non-well-founded sets
E2: General interactive computing is formally expressed by coinductive
models (coalgebras).
X = general (multi-stream) interaction, Y = coinductive models (coalgebras)
The extensions E1, E2 of the Church-Turing thesis provide mathematical
legitimacy for models of interaction. Non-well-founded set theory and coal-
gebras are coinductive extensions of inductive formal models of computation
that express extension of the intuitive algorithmic model of computation.
Section 2 introduces interaction machines as stream-processing agents and
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observation equivalence (bisimulation) as a metric for interactive expressive-
ness. Section 3 introduces non-well-founded set theory and coalgebras and
indicates how they model streams and labeled transition systems. Section 4
shows that eliminating initiality and replacing minimality by maximality ex-
plain the greater expressiveness of coinduction over induction. Section 5 exam-
ines metamathematical implications of computing, including the extension of
Church’s thesis, ontological commitment in mathematical models, and the role
of incompleteness theorems. Section 6 examines software engineering, showing
that interactive models provide a unifying framework for object-oriented and
agent-oriented programming.
2 From Turing to Interaction Machines
Turing machines (TMs) are ﬁnite agents that noninteractively transform input
into output strings by sequences of actions. TM computations for a given input
are history-independent and reproducible, since TMs always start in the same
initial state and shut out the world during computation.
Turing machine: TMs are state-transition machines M = (S, T, s0, F ),
with ﬁnite sets of states S and tape symbols T , a starting state s0, and a state-
transition relation F : S × T → S × T . TMs transform ﬁnite input strings
x ∈ T ∗ to outputs y = M(x) by a ﬁnite sequence of computation steps that
read a symbol i from the tape, perform a state transition (s, i)→ (s′, o), write
a symbol o, and/or move the reading head one position right or left [Tu1].
Interaction machines (IMs) play a role in modeling ﬁnite interactive agents
comparable to TMs for algorithms. Sequential interaction machines (SIMs)
model sequential interaction, transducing input into output streams.
Sequential interaction machine: SIMs are state-transition machines
M = (S,A,m) where S is an enumerable set of states, A is an enumerable set
of dynamically bound actions (stream elements), and the transition mapping
m: S × A → S maps state-action pairs into new states. Dynamic binding of
inputs is explicitly indicated by rewriting m as a mapping S → P (A×S) from
states to action-state pairs that expresses input nondeterminism of actions A.
Expressiveness of ﬁnite agents is speciﬁed by observation equivalence and is
measured by the ability of observers to distinguish agent behavior [WG]. TM
behaviors consist of sets of input-output pairs, while SIM behaviors consist of
sets of sequences of observations. Given two ﬁnite agentsM1,M2, their behav-
ior B(M1), B(M2) is distinguishable relative to a class of observers (testers) if
the exclusive-or B(M1)⊕B(M2) is nonempty. Members of this set are called
distinguishability certiﬁcates. Finite agents are equivalent if they cannot be
distinguished. Equivalence of two SIMs can be falsiﬁed by a ﬁnite distin-
guishability certiﬁcate (observation sequence) but cannot be ﬁnitely veriﬁed,
illustrating Popper’s point that empirical laws of physics can be empirically
falsiﬁed but not veriﬁed [Po]. Interactive equivalence expressed by bisimula-
tion [Mi] has greater distinguishing power than oﬀ-line equivalence.
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Inputs of TMs and computable functions are completely speciﬁed at the
start of a computation. Computable functions f : X → Y have a domain X
of input strings (integers) and determine a unique y = f(x) for each x ∈ X.
Interactive behavior cannot be speciﬁed as transformation from a domain X
to a range Y because streams are dynamically generated.
Interaction streams have the form (a1, o1), (a2, o2), . . ., where output ok is
computed from action ak but precedes and can inﬂuence ak+1. This input-
output coupling violates the separation of domains and ranges, causing dy-
namic dependence of inputs on prior outputs that is characteristic of inter-
active question-answering, dialog, and control processes. Late (lazy) binding
of interactive inputs (input nondeterminism) is more expressive than early
(static) binding not because interaction has greater function transformation
power but because the richer input domains cannot be inductively speciﬁed
by strings.
Persistent Turing machines (PTMs) are a canonical model for sequential
interaction that is as direct an extension of TMs as possible [GW].
Persistent Turing Machine: A PTM is a multitape TM with a persis-
tent work tape whose content is preserved between interactions.
Single interactions of a PTM correspond to TM computations, but its
persistent state allows its semantics to be extended to deﬁne SIM behavior.
A PTM determines a SIM (S,A, f), where S is the set of states (contents) of
the persistent worktape, and A is the set of inputs (corresponding to initial
TM inputs). The transtion function f is a mapping, f : A × S → S × O,
computed by the underlying TM. Elements of both S and A are ﬁnite at any
given time but unbounded.
To understand the extra power of SIMs over TMs, it is helpful to con-
sider the extra power of TMs over ﬁnite lookup tables (FLTs), which return
a value when given the corresponding key. A single-step transition for a TM
computation consists of performing table look-up of the new TM state and
tape action based on the current state and tape character. Besides table look-
up, the only additional work performed by a TM during each step consists of
“remembering” the state and performing tape I/O.
FLTs may be considered as primitive ﬁnite computing agents whose ex-
pressiveness is that of propositional calculus. A TM computation consisting
of a sequence of FLT lookups is more expressive than an FLT computation
because its behavior is no longer ﬁnite. Similarly, Turing-computable single-
step transitions are the primitive computation step of SIM computations. SIM
computations are more expressive than those of TMs because sequences of dy-
namically supplied (externally controlled) TM computation steps allow ﬁnite
agents to exhibit nonenumerable possible behaviors.
The informal argument that SIMs are not expressible by algorithms is
surprisingly simple, since it depends only on the notion that stream elements
are supplied dynamically.
Proposition: Computations of SIMs are not expressible by or reducible
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to computations of TMs.
Informal proof: TMs cannot be represented by ﬁnite inputs because any
ﬁnite input can always be interactively extended. Transduction of streams
cannot be modeled by transformation of strings. Streams do not have a last
element, can be dynamically extended by unpredictable adversaries, and can
use previous outputs in determining the next input. TM input strings have
a predetermined ﬁnite length that cannot be changed once the computation
has started.
A more reﬁned argument shows that SIMs are more expressive than TMs
for ﬁnite computations. Let k be the length (number of interaction steps) of
an interactive computation, and let Bk be the class of behaviors that can be
observed by observers who can make k or fewer interactions. We can show
that, for all k > 0, Bk ⊂ Bk+1, while the behavior of TMs corresponds to
B1 [WG]. Computations are more expressive for k+ 1 interactions than for k
interactions in the sense that they can make ﬁner observational distinctions.
Bisimulation [Mi] captures the greater observational distinguishing power of
k + 1 over k inputs.
SIMs that buﬀer the output of their ﬁrst k interactions can be distinguished
by k + 1 but not by k interactions. Interactive questioners (Ken Starr) can
elicit more information about a questioned subject (Clinton) by k+1 than by
k follow-up questions. The game 20 Questions further illustrates the power
of follow-up questions in gaining information. TMs have the expressiveness of
PTMs with k = 1: their behavior is limited to answering a single question (or
a predetermined noninteractive sequence of questions). The expressiveness of
sequential interaction has been examined in greater detail in [WG], both for
question-answering and for the Turing test [Tu2].
Multistream interaction machines (MIMs) are ﬁnite agents that interact
with multiple autonomous agents, like airline reservation systems or distributed
databases that provide services to multiple autonomous clients. MIM behav-
ior is not expressible by SIMs [WG], contrasting with the fact that multitape
TMs are no more expressive than single-tape TMs. Input-output coupling of
streams cannot be preserved under merging. We show [WG] that input-output
coupling (serializability) cannot be preserved for delegation of subtasks and
other forms of nonserializable behavior, proving that MIMs are more expres-
sive than SIMs:
Input-output coupling of autonomous streams cannot be preserved under
merging
MIMs express nonserializable behavior not expressible by SIMs
The restriction of MIMs to serializable behavior, just as the restriction of
SIMs to noninteractive behavior, realizes tractability at the cost of problem-
solving power. Adding autonomous streams (observation channels) to a ﬁnite
agent increases expressiveness, whereas adding noninteractive tapes simply




MIMs are more expressive than SIMs, while multitape and single tape TMs
are equally expressive
Serializing the eﬀect of multiple threads (streams) restricts the problem-
solving power of ﬁnite agents. Nonserializable behavior is a feature of col-
laboration that distinguishes high-level managers who handle interaction with
multiple subordinates from assembly line workers who interact with a single
stream [WG].
Collaboration, coordination, and management is modeled by MIMs but not
by SIMs or PTMs
The behavior of MIMs is harder to formalize than that of SIMs, and greater
expressiveness of MIMs than SIMs is harder to prove than greater expres-
siveness of SIMs than TMs. MIMs support the behavior of nonserializable
transactions and true concurrency [Pr], while SIMs support only serializable
transactions and interleaving concurrency. The metric of distinguishability
(observation nonequivalence) determines an expressiveness hierarchy for se-
quential interaction and greater expressiveness of MIMs than SIMs.
3 Non-Well-Founded Sets and Coalgebras
Though questions of expressiveness can be formulated and proved entirely in
terms of machine-based notions, reformulation in terms of non-well-founded
set theory and coalgebras lends mathematical legitimacy to interactive models.
A binary relation R on a set S is non-well-founded if there is an inﬁnite
sequence bI ∈ S for i = 0, 1, 2, . . ., such that bi + 1Rbi for all I, and is
well-founded otherwise. Well-foundedness of sets is deﬁned in terms of well-
foundedness of the set membership relation ∈; set is well-founded if the set
membership relation over its structure is well-founded and is non-well-founded
otherwise. Well-founded sets have only ﬁnite set-membership chains, while
non-well-founded sets may have inﬁnite set-membership chains.
Sets in traditional set theory are inductively constructible from atomic
elements by union, intersection, complement, and cross-product constructors
that construct sets with atomic elements. The powerset constructor constructs
sets whose elements are also sets. Zermelo-Frankel set theory provides an
axiomatic speciﬁcation ZFC- of set theory that can be supplemented by the
foundation axiom to obtain the inductively speciﬁable sets ZFC.
foundation axiom (FA): all sets are well-founded (inductively deﬁnable).
FA excludes non-well-founded sets, which are deﬁned by systems of ﬂat set
equations.
ﬂat set equations: A system of ﬂat set equations has the form (S,A,m),
where S is a set of variables (states), A is a set of constants (actions, observa-
tions) and m : S → P (A ∪ S) is a mapping that speciﬁes for each s ∈ S a set
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of constants in A and variables in S. A non-well-founded set can be deﬁned
as a set that is the solution of a system of ﬂat set equations.
Equations of the form m : S → P (A × S) whose right-hand sides are
sets of ordered pairs can be expressed as ﬂat equations by the transformation
(a, b)→ a, a, b [BM].
Example: The solution of the set equation s = {(0, s), (1, s)} is the set of
inﬁnite binary strings, illustrating that non-well-founded sets may be nonenu-
merable.
Non-well-founded set theory augments ZFC- with the anti-foundation ax-
iom (AFA) to obtain ZFA. [BM] speciﬁes AFA by the condition that all ﬂat
systems of equations have unique solutions.
anti-foundation axiom (AFA): Every ﬂat system of equations has a
unique solution (ZFC- + AFA = ZFA).
ZFA is consistent if ZFC- is consistent and admits a larger class of sets
(models a larger class of systems) than ZFC. The solution of the set equation
s = {(0, s), (1, s)} does not satisfy FA and cannot be inductively generated.
It is not a member of ZFC, illustrating that the class ZFA is strictly larger
than ZFC.
Non-well-founded sets can model labeled transition systems (LTSs). An
LTS with n states can be speciﬁed by a system of n simultaneous set equations
(S,A,m), where m : S → P (A × S) maps states into subsets of action-state
pairs. For example, a state with outgoing edges labeled a to s1, b to s2, and
c to s3 is represented by the mapping s→ {(a, s1), (b, s2), (c, s3)}.
The mapping function m for systems of ﬂat set equations is coalgebraic.
Coalgebras are a model for interactive computing that parallels algebras as a
modeling framework for algorithms. Algebraic computing steps specify incre-
mental expression evaluation whose goal is to compute a value, while coalge-
braic computing steps specify incremental system observation whose goal is
to determine system behavior.
Algebras are structures A = (S,m : F (S)→ S), where S is the carrier set
and F is a functor that determines the signature of A. We usually interpret
S as a set of values and m : F (S) rightarrowS is a value-preserving homo-
morphism from a syntactically speciﬁed set of expressions into a value set.
Algebras determine reduction processes (mappings) from an inductively de-
ﬁned initial algebra of syntactically speciﬁed expressions to a quotient algebra
that determines the value set.
Coalgebras are structures CA = (S,m : S → Γ(S)), where S is a carrier
set and Γ is a functor that determines the signature of CA. We usually
interpret S as a set of states of an observed system and m : S → Γ(S) as a
behavior-preserving homomorphism from observed systems with an unknown
state into unfolded set of behaviors (observation sequences). Coalgebras whose
mappings are one-to-one are called ﬁnal coalgebras. States of ﬁnal coalgebras




Initial algebras are an inductively speciﬁed set of expressions, while ﬁnal
coalgebras are coinductively speciﬁed non-well-founded sets. The greater rich-
ness of non-well-founded over well-founded sets translates into greater compu-
tation power of coalgebras over algebras. Coalgebraic homomorphisms that
map systems into their behaviors are stronger than algebraic homomorphisms
that map expressions into values because equivalence classes of systems with
the same behavior (for example, programs that compute the same function)
are nonenumerable, while classes of expressions with the same value are enu-
merable.
Coalgebras that specify non-well-founded sets and model sequential inter-
action have mappings of the form m : S → P (A ∪ S), corresponding to the
AFA. It is shown in [BM] that mappings such as m : S → P (A×S) of LTSs or
mappings m : S → O × P (A× S) of automata are expressible as ﬂat systems
of equations. However, coalgebraic mappings can be more complex and model
some forms of multi-stream interaction.
Coalgebraic mappings of the form S → Γ(S) are “Markovian” in the sense
that the new state depends only on the previous state. Non-Markovian map-
pings of the form Γ′(S)→ Γ(S) can model some transaction systems (MIMs)
whose next state depends on several previous states. We conjecture that inter-
action of overlapping operations with duration or multi-agent interaction may
require still more complex mappings. Moreover, we believe that consistent ex-
tensions of set theory that admit larger sets than the non-well-founded sets are
possible, corresponding to nonsequential and multi-stream ﬁnite agents [WG].
In principle, any ﬁnite agent can be modeled by a consistent extension of set
theory that expresses the class of behaviors computable by the agent and may
have a coalgebraic mapping function more complex than that of non-well-
founded sets. The formalization of multi-stream interaction is a subject of
future research beyond the scope of this paper.
4 From Induction to Coinduction
Induction determines a construction paradigm for deﬁnition, reasoning, and
modeling characterized by an initiality condition, an iteration condition that
allows new elements to be constructed (derived) from initial elements, and a
minimality condition that only elements so constructed are deﬁnable:
inductive deﬁnition: initiality (base) condition, constructive iteration
condition, minimality condition
construction paradigm: generate structures inductively from base ele-
ments
Induction is the basis for deﬁning sets of strings, languages, formal systems,
and computable functions. For example, the set A∗ of all strings over an
alphabet A is inductively deﬁned by an iterative concatenation rule:
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Strings: (1) the empty string e ∈ A∗; (2) if x ∈ A∗ then ax ∈ A∗; (3) A∗
contains no other elements.
Grammars G deﬁne languages L(G) over terminal symbols T with the aid
of nonterminal symbols N as sets of strings inductively generated from an
initial nonterminal S ∈ N by generating rules (productions) P :
A language L(G) over T is the set L(G) = {x ∈ T ∗|S ⇒ x}, where
G = (N, T, S, P ) is a grammar with nonterminals N , terminals T , initial
symbol S ∈ N and productions P . The derivation relation ⇒ is the multi-
step transitive closure of the single-step derivation relation deﬁned by P .
Theorems of a formal system are inductively derived from axioms by rules
of inference:
A formal system FS = (AX, TH,RI) is an inductive speciﬁcation of a
set TH of theorems, where (1) axioms AX are theorems; (2) formulae derived
from theorems by rules of inference RI are theorems; and (3) no other formulae
are theorems.
Formal systems are inductive at two distinct levels. Well-formed formulae
and axioms are deﬁned by static induction, while processes of proof are deﬁned
by dynamic induction. The set of provable theorems is deﬁned by inductively
derivable formulae from inductively deﬁned axioms.
inductively deﬁned domain (statics): the domain X is inductively de-
ﬁned
inductively deﬁned computation (dynamics): the process of compu-
tation is inductively deﬁned
Computable functions f : X → Y likewise make use of two levels of induc-
tive deﬁnition. They map an inductively deﬁned domain X to a range Y by
inductively deﬁned computing processes [Tu1]. TMs transform inductively-
deﬁned strings by inductively deﬁned state-transition steps. This condition is
suﬃcient as well as necessary: computable functions can be deﬁned as induc-
tive computations over inductively deﬁned domains.
Coinduction determines a deconstruction paradigm that deconstructs com-
posite structures into progressively more primitive ones. Non-well-founded
sets are coinductively deﬁned by a process of progressive decomposition into
subsets that terminates ﬁnitely for well-founded (inductive) sets. Coinduction
reverses the direction of iteration of an associated inductive process and re-
places initiality with ﬁnality. Non-well-founded sets introduce a larger class
of sets by eliminating ﬁnite termination, thereby eliminating initiality of dual
inductive processes.
Coinduction models processes of observation. Elimination of ﬁnite ter-
mination corresponds to the fact that processes of observation can continue
to reveal new knowledge about the observed objects indeﬁnitely: hidden in-
formation is progressively approximated by processes that do not terminate.
Coinduction reverses the direction of iteration, eliminates the initiality/ﬁnality
condition, and replaces the minimality condition by a maximality condition:
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coinductive deﬁnition: deconstructive iteration condition, maximality
condition
observation paradigm: observe and transduce already existing constructed
elements
A stream over A is an ordered pair s = (a, t), where a ∈ A and t is another
stream. The set S of all streams over A is the maximal solution (maximal
ﬁxed point) of the equation S = A × S. Sets that are solutions of recursive
stream equations do not exist in traditional set theory, where stream equations
have the trivial empty set as their solution. The minimal ﬁxed point of the
equation S = A×S is the empty set, while the maximal ﬁxed point is the set
of all streams over S.
By expressing induction and coinduction in terms of more primitive con-
cepts, we can separately consider the eﬀect of reversing iteration, eliminating
initiality, and replacing minimality by maximality in deﬁnition and reasoning
processes. Finite coinductive termination, like initiality, is a closed-system
requirement whose elimination models open systems. Elimination of initiality
is related to shedding of the initial-state (and ﬁnal-state) requirement in ex-
tending Turing machines to interaction machines. It removes the requirement
of complete environment speciﬁcation before the computation starts.
Minimality, modeled by least ﬁxed points, is a property of constructive pro-
cesses of computation and constructive mathematics, while maximality, mod-
eled by greatest ﬁxed points, is a property of empirical observation paradigms
for describing observed behavior in an already constructed (already existing)
world. Minimality of behavior is associated with maximality of constraints
on behavior, while maximality of behavior is associated with minimality of
constraints. Maximal ﬁxed points (minimal constraints) provide a mathemat-
ical framework for the empirical paradigm that any behavior (possible world)
consistent with observation is admissible. Speciﬁcations that admit any pos-
sible world consistent with a speciﬁcation are maximal ﬁxed points (minimal
constraints on behavior).
The distinction between possible-world semantics of Kripke [Kr] and tra-
ditional model theory is precisely that of maximality versus minimality. Dis-
tinctions between restrictive and permissive social organization, such as those
between totalitarian and democratic societies, are modeled by minimality ver-
sus maximality. Minimality models centrally controlled structures while max-
imality admits distributed control:
the minimality principle is totalitarianism: everything is forbidden
that is not allowed
the maximality principle is democracy: everything is allowed that is
not forbidden
Non-well-founded set theory extends traditional set theory with sets that
are solutions to recursive set equations. It provides a framework for formaliz-
ing sets with a coinductive (non-well-founded) structure, and correspondingly
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extends the class of models that sets can formalize to include interactive mod-
els of computation. Coinduction extends the deﬁnition and reasoning ability
of ﬁnite computing agents so they can model nonenumerable sets deﬁned by
streams.
Algorithmic denotational semantics is speciﬁed by lattice-structured ap-
proximations to least ﬁxed points that determine computable functions [Sc],
while traditional operational semantics expresses the state-transition structure
of algorithm execution steps. Non-well-founded sets express richer denotations
than well-founded sets, specifying maximal ﬁxed points. Non-well-founded set
theory provides a denotational semantics for streams, while coalgebras pro-
vide a framework for operational semantics of interaction machines that are
transducers of streams [WG].
5 Metamathematics of Coinduction
The views of Church and Turing in the early 1930’s were strongly inﬂuenced
by the intense debates on mathematical foundations in the early 20th century,
which were in turn inﬂuenced by Kant’s earlier analysis of the distinction
between necessary truths of mathematics and contingent truths of physics
[De]. Church’s interest in the “intuitive” notion of computing was due in part
to the prominence of Brouwer’s “intuitionism” and Hilbert’s “formalism” as
paradigms of mathematical thought.
Coinductive models require reexamination of “foundations” for both math-
ematics and computing, suggesting new interpretations of both Brouwer’s “in-
tuitionist” belief that mathematical reasoning is based on inner intuitions, and
of Hilbert’s “formalist” belief that mathematical reasoning can be deﬁned by
formal logic. Coinductive thinking can be viewed as a new paradigm that
replaces intuitionism and formalism by qualitatively new forms of reasoning.
We prefer to view it as a strengthening of intuitionism and formalism that ex-
presses stronger forms of intentionality and stronger (interactive) forms of the
Turing test [We3]. Coinduction models stronger behavior of ﬁnite agents than
traditional intuitionist or formalist models because of a stronger ontological
commitment to the existence of mathematical objects.
In this section, we examine the relation between intuitive and formal no-
tions of computing of Church’s thesis, consider Godel-style incompleteness
theorems for coinductive models of computation, and reexamine notions of
constructive, formalist, and realist mathematics for coinductive modeling.
5.1 From Formal Models to Intuitive Notions
Understanding of relations between formalisms and intuitive notions being for-
malized is a central goal both of Godel’s work on completeness/incompleteness
and of Church’s thesis. Theses that relate intuitive to formal models of com-
puting can be motivated either by the desire to formalize a given intuitive no-
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tion or by the goal of providing intuition for a given formal concept. Church’s
thesis has the second motivation, providing intuitions for the robust formal
concept of computability expressible by Turing machines, the lambda calcu-
lus, or partial recursive functions. He recognized that the answer to such
questions could not be deﬁnitive, but the equivalent expressiveness of alterna-
tive formalisms for computability appeared to provide strong evidence for the
Church-Turing thesis.
Church-Turing thesis: Formal eﬀective computability by the lambda
calculus (Church) or TMs (Turing) expresses the intuitive notion of eﬀective
computability of functions (over positive integers).
The Church-Turing thesis answers the question “What is the intuitive no-
tion of computing that is expressed by TMs?”, but not the question “What is
the formal model that expresses the intuitive notion of computing?”. In the
early years of computing the intuitive notion of computing was identiﬁed with
algorithms, and the two above questions were considered to have the same
answer. As technology became increasingly interactive, and it was realized
that algorithms could not express interaction, the intuitive notion of comput-
ing continued to be formalized by TMs because no formal model beyond that
of TMs or well-founded set theory was available. Non-well-founded set the-
ory and SIMs provide well-deﬁned mathematical and machine models that go
beyond algorithms, allowing the thesis to be extended.
We do not disagree with Church’s thesis but claim that the robustness
of Church-Turing models is due to their common inductive limitation rather
than their ability to completely express all forms of computation. Coinduc-
tive models uniformly extend the expressiveness of machines, algebras, and
set theory. Coinduction provides a more expressive mental tool for deﬁnition,
reasoning, and modeling that shows Turing machines to be weak expressive
models limited by induction. When the intuitive notion of eﬀective computa-
tion is broadened to include interaction, the formal notion of computability
must be correspondingly broadened to coinductive speciﬁcation by non-well-
founded sets.
Thesis for sequential interaction: Formal speciﬁability by non-well-
founded sets, SIMs, or PTMs corresponds to the intuitive notion of eﬀective
computability for sequential (single-stream) interaction.
The Church-Turing thesis was formalized in terms of computable functions
f : X → Y from integers to integers. Domains X of integers model eﬀective
Turing computability but exclude interaction streams (section 2) whose do-
mains are not inductively deﬁnable. Expressing domains as integers requires
complete speciﬁcation of arguments before the computation starts and sepa-
rability of domains and ranges: conditions assumed by Church and Turing but
violated by streams. Stream mappings f : stream → stream are certainly not
functions from integers to integers: whether they are classiﬁed as noncom-
putable functions (over noninductive domains) or computable nonfunctions
(because mappings over noninductive domains are not considered functions)
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is a matter of deﬁnition. The question of whether computable mappings over
noninductive domains are functions has not, to the authors’ knowledge, been
formally settled.
The Church-Turing thesis is a conjecture about the restricted notion of
algorithmic computation rather than about the broader intuitive notion of
computing. The thesis for sequential interaction is likewise a conjecture about
a restricted notion of computing that non-well-founded sets are not the most
expressive class of consistent set theoretic models and that more powerful con-
sistent models are axiomatically deﬁnable. More expressive classes of comput-
ing mechanisms may be deﬁnable by replacing the AFA by a consistent axiom
that speciﬁes a larger class of sets. We further conjecture that there is no well-
deﬁned maximal class of axiomatically deﬁnable consistent sets, and that no
well-deﬁned formal notion of maximal eﬀective computability exists. This sug-
gests that any formal notion of eﬀective computability is relative rather than
absolute, deﬁnable only relative to assumptions about the form of interaction.
5.2 Reinterpreting Godel Incompleteness
Godel’s incompleteness result showed the impossibility of Hilbert’s program
of reducing mathematics to ﬁrst-order logic [Fe] and by implication the im-
possibility of reducing the behavior of ﬁnite computing agents to logic [WG].
Completeness results establish the adequacy of syntactic formalisms for com-
pletely expressing semantics concepts. Church’s thesis, that equates formal
(syntactic) with intuitive (semantic) notions of computation, can be viewed
as a completeness conjecture of TMs for an intuitive semantic notion of com-
putability.
Godel’s incompleteness theorem can be viewed as a result about the weak-
ness (incompleteness) of inductive reasoning for objective mathematical sys-
tems that include integer arithmetic. However, Turing’s model of computation
is “pre-Godelian” in its inductive (constructive) model of the notion of compu-
tation. The position that TMs completely express intuitive computability can
be equated to Hilbert’s position that ﬁrst-order logic completely formalizes
mathematics.
Godel took advantage of the fact that computable functions are inductively
speciﬁable in his use of Godel numbering to enumerate the TMs. First-order
logic can model only enumerable semantic domains because its number of
theorems is enumerable, which is easy to prove. Proving that a particular se-
mantic domain is nonenumerable and therefore inductively incomplete can be
hard, but diagonalization is a useful tool in proving nonenumerability and was
used by both Cantor to prove nonenumerability of the reals and Godel to show
nonenumerability of the true assertions about integer arithmetic. Godel’s in-
completeness result is a simple corollary of the “folk theorem” that inductively
speciﬁed enumerable classes of theorems cannot completely model nonenumer-
able classes of objects or situations [We3].
13
Wegner, Goldin
First-order logic can model only inductively (recursively) enumerable seman-
tic domains
To prove Godel incompleteness of any domain, show it is not inductively
enumerable
Diagonalization is a tool for showing that speciﬁc domains are not induc-
tively enumerable
Interaction machines have nonenumerable possible behaviors and are there-
fore Godel incomplete. Well-founded sets are enumerable while non-well-
founded sets are not. Incompleteness of sequential interaction can be directly
proved by showing that non-well-founded sets cannot be expressed as well-
founded sets. Godel’s incompleteness result implies not only that inductive
mathematics is too weak to express arithmetic over the integers, but also that
interactive models are incomplete. The incompleteness of interactive models
is easier to prove than incompleteness of arithmetic because interactive models
are more strongly nonenumerable than recursively enumerable sets.
Linear logic [Gi] provides a bisimulation-based semantics of interaction
for two-person games [Ab] more ﬁne-grained than that of computable func-
tions. It is described in [Ab] as an “intensional” semantics of interaction that
“interpolates between denotational and operation semantics as traditionally
conceived”. But in fact it extrapolates beyond traditional semantics by build-
ing a “second-order” operational semantics on top of a denotational semantics
for functions. We conjecture that linear logic is complete for sequential inter-
action in the sense that it can express the behavior of any SIM and provides
a model for non-well-founded set theory. However, the exploration of connec-
tions between linear logic and non-well-founded set theory is beyond the scope
of this paper.
We further conjecture that multi-stream behavior of MIMs cannot be ex-
pressed by non-well-founded sets or linear logic and that for every MIM there
is a consistent coinductive axiomatic speciﬁcation of set theory that expresses
its behavior. This suggests the following extension of the Church-Turing thesis
for general interactive behavior.
Coinductive Church-Turing thesis: Coinductively speciﬁable behav-
iors expressible by axiomatic set theory correspond to the intuitive notion of
computations expressible by ﬁnite computing agents.
In [We3] MIM behavior is related to quantum-theoretic nondeterminism
and coinductive speciﬁcation is extended beyond “hidden variables” to hidden
active interfaces that cause nondeterministic behavior. However, further elab-
oration of the coinductive Church-Turing thesis is beyond the scope of this
paper.
This thesis can be formulated as a completeness thesis for coinductive
computation. Each of our three Church-Style theses can be viewed as a com-
pleteness result about the characterization of an intuitive by a formal notion
of computation, while the hierarchy of progressively stronger theses deter-
mine incompleteness results of the weaker thesis as an expression of formal or
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intuitive semantics of the stronger thesis.
Godel credits his mathematical successes to his Platonic belief in the in-
dependent reality of mathematical objects, arrived at early in his university
years [Fe]. His proof that arithmetic for integers could not be formalized was
motivated by his belief in “philosophical realism”. But Godel concealed his
Platonist (realist) beliefs, using Platonist principles as a basis for research
rather than as a topic for analysis.
5.3 From Coinductive to Realist Ontology
Non-well-founded sets can model larger classes of objects, situations, and com-
putational problems than well-founded sets because axioms of ZFA admit
existence of a larger class of sets than axioms of ZFC. The existential (onto-
logical) strength of mathematical paradigms determines the expressiveness of
their models. Questions of mathematical existence are central to Russell’s at-
tempted reduction of mathematics to logic, Brouwer’s intuitionism, Hilbert’s
formalism, and Godel’s incompleteness result [De].
Logicians were reluctant to accept coinductive models based on circular
reasoning because they failed to distinguish between inconsistent and con-
sistent forms of circular reasoning, following Russell in overreacting to the
paradoxes of set theory [BM]. An additional reason for excluding coinduc-
tive thinking from mainstream mathematics was the restrictive inﬂuence on
logic of constructive mathematics exempliﬁed by Brouwer’s intuitionism and
Hilbert’s formalism.
Though Hilbert in principle accepted the Platonic position that consistency
(of a formalism) implies existence (of a model), he restricted formalism to
inductive deﬁnition and reasoning, excluding consistent as well as inconsistent
forms of circular reasoning. When Godel proved incompleteness of arithmetic
by showing, through diagonalization, that true assertions of arithmetic cannot
be inductively deﬁned, the mainstream mathematical community accepted
incompleteness as an absolute impossibility result for formalist mathematics
rather than a relative result about the weakness of inductive reasoning.
Finsler’s prescient work on set theory in the 1920’s [Fi] showed the consis-
tency of circular reasoning and anticipated Godel’s incompleteness result, but
was largely ignored because it did not conform to the mainstream paradigm
of formalist mathematics. Finsler, inﬂuenced by Cantor’s model of the real
numbers, took to its logical conclusion the viewpoint that concepts exist inde-
pendently of formalisms in which they are expressed. He went beyond Hilbert’s
formalism in applying the principle “consistency implies existence”, accept-
ing the existence of consistent sets of concepts independently of whether they
are formalized. The discovery sixty years after the foundational discussions
of the 1920’s that non-well-founded set theory models interactive computing
validates the view that conceptually consistent possible worlds exist indepen-
dently of their formalizability or constructibility.
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We call this viewpoint a realist ontology of mathematics. Realism tradi-
tionally refers to models that accord an existence to modeled objects indepen-
dently of whether they are perceived [EB]. By analogy, mathematical realism,
as we deﬁne it, accords objects an existence independently of whether they are
formalized. Realism in mathematics and empiricism in physics and comput-
ing both accord independent existence to objects being modeled, providing a
foundation for empirical computer science and a basis for an interdisciplinary
methodology of empiricism [We3].
Intuitionism, inductive formalism, and realism can be classiﬁed by their
degree of commitment to the existence of mathematical objects, embodying
progressively stronger forms of ontological commitment that can model pro-
gressively larger classes of applications.
intuitionism (Brouwer): existence requires (inductive) constructibility
(minimal ontology)
inductive formalism (Hilbert): consistency of (inductive) formal sys-
tems implies existence of models
realism (Cantor, Finsler): consistency (of a speciﬁcation) implies exis-
tence (maximal ontology)
Coinductive models of ﬁnite agents are realist in the sense that they can
model both nonenumerable real-number domains and physical domains like
the real world. They relate mathematical and physical meanings of the term
“real” because coinduction models both mathematical nonenumerability and
physical interaction. They determine an ontological paradigm shift from con-
structive to realist models. Constructive inductively deﬁned ontologies speci-
ﬁed by least ﬁxed points are weaker than realist coinductively deﬁned ontolo-
gies speciﬁed by greatest ﬁxed points. Maximal ﬁxed points admit interactive
and time-dependent behavior for ﬁnite agents: they provide a mathematical
foundation for realist ontology.
Hilbert’s inconsistency in claiming to accept the realist principle “consis-
tency implies existence” (C → E), but limiting its application to inductive
formalism is a primary cause of Godel incompleteness. Feferman [Fe] does not
adequately explain Godel’s reasons for his surprising opposition to (C → E).
Our analysis suggests that it may stem from the fact that C → E is incom-
patible with Godel’s belief in objective mathematics and his acceptance of the
inductive formalism of his teacher Hilbert. Godel’s puzzling removal of an
incisive discussion of C → E between the initial and published version of his
thesis [Fe] may well be due to his failure to resolve perceived contradictions
between the principle of C → E and Hilbert formalism.
Claim: C → E, inductive formalism, and objective mathematics cannot
be simultaneously true.
C → E, inductive models, and objective mathematics are three alternative
starting points for a mathematical Weltanschauung that are incompatible.




Hilbert: C → E + inductive formalism; inconsistency with objective math-
ematics was proved by Godel
Godel: objective mathematics + inductive formalism; explains Godel’s re-
jection of C → E
Cantor, Finsler: C → E + objective mathematics; implies rejection of in-
ductive formalism
Hilbert’s belief in C → E and inductive formalism was shown by Godel
to be incompatible with objective mathematics, while Godel’s belief in ob-
jective mathematics and inductive formalism caused him to reject C → E.
The realist, coinductive paradigm of mathematics corresponds to Cantor and
Finsler’s belief in C → E and objective mathematics, which require rejection
of inductive formalism.
Godel’s incompleteness result was due to acceptance of the principle that
inductively deﬁned objects have a mathematical existence while coinductively
deﬁned objects do not. Had Godel instead accepted C → E and recognized
along with Finsler that this implied acceptance of coinductive reasoning, his
incompleteness result for inductive reasoning would have become a complete-
ness result for coinductive reasoning and the evolution of logic might have
been very diﬀerent.
6 Interactive Software Technology
The evolution of computer architecture from mainframes to personal comput-
ers and networks, of software engineering from procedure-oriented to object-
oriented and component-based systems, and of AI from logic-based to agent-
oriented and distributed systems has followed parallel paths [We1]. According
to the capsule history below, the 1950’s through the 1970’s were concerned
with the development and reﬁnement of algorithm technology for mainframes,
sequential interaction became the dominant technology of the 1980’s, while
distributed interaction became the dominant technology in the 1990’s:
1950’s: machine language, assemblers, hardware-deﬁned action sequences
1960’s: procedure-oriented languages, compilers, programmer-deﬁned ac-
tion sequences
1970’s: structured programming, composition of action sequences, algo-
rithm composition
1980’s: object-based languages, personal computers, sequential interaction
architecture
1990’s: structured object-based programming, networks, distributed inter-
action architecture
Whereas the shift from machine to procedure-oriented languages involves
merely a change in the granularity of actions, the shift from procedures to ob-
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Fig. 1. Parallel Extensions from Algorithms to Interaction
to interaction. The extension from sequential to distributed interaction re-
quires a further fundamental paradigm shift in models of computation. SIMs
express the shift from algorithms to sequential interaction architecture, while
MIMs express the further shift to distributed interaction.
Figure 1 illustrates the extension from algorithms to interaction along a
number of dimensions. Each algorithmic concept in the left-hand column is
paralleled by a more expressive interactive concept in the right-hand column.
Moreover, each right-hand concept has both a single-agent (sequential) and
a multi-agent (distributed) form whose expressiveness is speciﬁed by SIMs
and MIMs. The domain-independent generality of SIMs and MIMs is both
an advantage in providing a uniform modeling framework and a drawback in
that general models provide little guidance for domain-speciﬁc applications.
The transition from the view that computing is primarily concerned with
input-output transformations to the view that computing systems provide
services over time arises in many diﬀerent contexts. Services over time are
speciﬁed by models of interaction that cannot be reduced to or expressed by al-
gorithms or TMs. Algorithms are time-independent (instantaneous) episodes
in the life-cycle of an interactive systems. The one-dimensional quantitative
performance metric of algorithmic complexity becomes the multidimensional
qualitative performance metric of quality of service (QoS), which is an in-
creasingly central focus for research in the database and human-computer
interaction communities.
Procedures and objects both determine a contract between providers and
clients of a resource, but objects provide richer services to clients that can-
not be expressed by algorithmically speciﬁed procedures. Algorithms are like
sales contracts, guaranteeing an output for every input, while objects are like
marriage contracts, describing ongoing contracts for services over time. An
object’s contract with its clients speciﬁes its behavior for all contingencies
of interaction (in sickness and in health) over the lifetime of the object (till
death us do part) [We1]. The folk wisdom that marriage contracts cannot
be reduced to sales contracts is computationally expressed by interaction not
being reducible to algorithms.
Though object-based programming has become a dominant technology, its
foundations are still shaky. Everyone talks about it but no one knows what
it is. “Knowing what it is” has proved elusive because of the implicit belief
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that “what it is” must be deﬁned in terms of algorithms. Interactive models
have the liberating eﬀect of providing a broader framework than algorithms
for deﬁning “what it is”. Component-based software technology is even less
mature than object-based technology: it is the technology underlying inter-
operability, coordination models, pattern theory, and the World Wide Web.
Knowing what it is in turn requires liberation from sequential object-based
models.
Structured programming [Di] proved too weak as a model for program
structure because the transition to object-oriented programming made pro-
cedural structured programming based on composing algorithms and while
statements obsolete. Objects have behavior that cannot be compositionally
expressed in terms of the behavior of their components. Structured program-
ming for actions (verbs) can be formally deﬁned by function composition,
while structured programming for objects (nouns) is modeled by design pat-
terns that have no compositional formal speciﬁcations [GHJV]. As a conse-
quence, the study of design pattern methods of component composition is an
art rather than a science.
Compositionality is a desirable property for formal tractability of pro-
grams that has led to advocacy of functional and logic programming as a
basis for computation. But it limits expressiveness by requiring the whole to
be expressible as the sum of its parts. Actual object-oriented programs and
computer networks exhibit noncompositional emergent behavior. There are
inherent trade-oﬀs between formalizability and expressiveness that are clearly
brought out by the expressive limitations of compositionality. Arguments in
the 1960’s that go-tos are considered harmful for formalizability can be paral-
leled by arguments in the 1990’s that compositionality is considered harmful
for expressiveness.
Programming in the large (PIL) is not determined by size, since a pro-
gram consisting of a sequence of a million addition instructions is not PIL.
PIL is synonymous with interactive programming, diﬀering qualitatively from
programming in the small in the same way that interactive programs diﬀer
from algorithms. Embedded and reactive systems that provide services over
time are PIL, while noninteractive problem solving is not PIL, even when the
algorithm is complex and the program is large.
The evolution of artiﬁcial intelligence from logic and search to agent-
oriented programming is remarkably similar to the evolution of software en-
gineering. This paradigm shift is evident in research on agents [Ag], on in-
teractive planning and control [DW], and in textbooks that systematically
reformulate AI in terms of intelligent agents [RN]. AI illustrates more clearly
than software engineering that reasoning is an inadequate basis for model-
ing [We1]. Though logic is a form of computation, computation cannot be en-
tirely reduced to logic. The goals of the Fifth-Generation Computing Project
of the 1980’s, which aimed to provide a logic-based framework for universal
computation, were in principle unrealizable.
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Open systems can be precisely deﬁned as interactive systems: interactive
models provide a tool for classifying forms of openness and for analyzing open-
system behavior. Empirical computer science can likewise be precisely deﬁned
as the study of interactive systems [We3].
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